Rumafia.com continues to publish "secret" material from the archives of the Interior Ministry, dedicated to the largest shadow bankers and their patrons. From this reference, readers can learn how a group of financiers caused damage to the state accounted 4 trillion rubles, as well as who of the representatives of the Bank of Russia and the security services, according to investigators, covered the creators of this giant financial "funnel".

Reference

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation on a scheduled basis is carrying a set of measures aimed at protecting and strengthening the credit and financial system of the Russian Federation, including combating illicit trafficking of cash used for financing organized crime, terrorism, extremism, bribing corrupt officials and holding them to the authorities.

         Money supply in the Russian Federation over the past seven years has grown more than 6 times, significantly outstripping the growth of the real economy, there is a transfer of funds in the informal sector of the economy.

        With the growth of the money supply organized criminal community have intensified in recent years, the activity of which is to provide services to various entities associated with illegal "cashing" money and the withdrawal of currency abroad.

           During the investigation of some criminal cases №№ 169277, 290983, 248089, 248103 by the Investigative Committee of Russian Interior Ministry, it was found that business related to illicit financial and banking activities acquired highly organized systemic. It is confirmed not only by within the organized criminal community (OCC) and the general public banks, but also a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities among them.

            According to operational information obtained in the framework of the investigation of a number of criminal cases conducted by Investigative Committee of the Russian Interior Ministry, it was found that there are more than a dozen illegal financial centers in Moscow under the control of organized crime, including international.

          Only on the territory of Moscow are more than 10 large-scale organized crime groups each of which carries out illegal banking operations of between $ 5-20 billion rubles each day.

          Out of this sum, about 300-700 million rubles is "cashing", from 700-1,5 million rubles are transit operations to foreign banks, the rest of the operations is  "launder" and transfer to other credit institutions for the purpose of transit, "cashing out", the purchase of real estate enterprises, theft of VAT from the budget, etc.

         These operations are carried out by illegal banking activities, the provision fictitious statements to the Central Bank of Russia, forgery of securities and payment documents. First, money laundering takes place, which comes from crime from theft of budget funds at various levels and the federal property, tax evasion, smuggling, illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Almost all operations are carried out for the benefit of third parties (commercial, state-owned enterprises, enterprises with foreign capital). Part of the laundered and cashed funds goes to finance terrorism and extremism, as well as bribery of officials in order to promote their own people in power.

     This mechanism has been functioning for more than 7 years.

     The analysis of materials, installed and documented mechanism used in the commission of illegal acts. So through entities controlled by the Bank of Russia, DEB Russian Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service of the Russian representatives of OCC acquire credit institutions necessary for them to conduct illegal financial transactions. These credit institutions are required to work using illegal scheme (Bank "trailer"). In addition to the "trailer" accounts more than 100 companies' target organizations are opened by members of OCC. Big sums are going through several offshore accounts which hold and laundering operations, "cashing" and transit. The credit organization with the help of officials of the MGTU of Bank of Russia do "signings" (the chairman of the credit organization, the chief accountant, changing the founders). Clients are sent details of the "setting - targeted" companies, which transfer funds.

After getting payments, the funds go to the accounts of other targeted companies ("Operation Cleanup") using system of bank-client. Companies accounts can be opened more than in 50 credit institutions, which are located in almost the entire territory of the Russian Federation. As a result, the beginning of the payment and the end is almost impossible to find, because the money can be accumulated and held more than on 40 accounts of "target companies" issued on lost passports. As a result, the credit institution itself actually plays the role of a legal shell for illegal operations. Apart from the "target companies" a number of correspondent bank accounts are opened between a credit institution. Depending on the amount of the estimated volume of money correspondent accounts can be opened in more than 50 credit organizations in the Russian Federation, 10 foreign credit institutions. But in the basic scheme are so-called bank "donors", Sberbank, "Alfa-Bank" Ural-Siberian", "Nomos-bank" where currency and rubles are purchased. As for the purchase of cash rubles, gas stations, markets and terminals for payment of communications services are actively used.

             In this "business" there is almost no downtime, as all OCC are well integrated with each other and provide services for operations, acting as operator. Also, they appoint agreement rate on the "cashing" and transit for each trading day.

          For each credit institution scheme runs from 3 weeks to several months. It depends on the curators of the Bank of Russia, the Federal Security Service of Russia, the Russian Interior Ministry, when and how they will be able to cover the stream from publicity. Always for secure holding of cash flow, after 10 days of work check from GIKO Bank of Russia with the curators of the offices of the comes GTU  the bank "trailer". In the check there is always a person who is entrusted with the function of the contact with the OCC and ensure conditions for their work, and later destruction of documents. After the check, Banking Supervision Committee makes revocation of the license of a credit organization. Until the last day, people who are in the committee has full control of the process of movement of documents and has the ability to extend the work of the bank for a few days. This procedure is carried out for an additional "rollback" of money to some mid-level officials of the Bank of Russia. Next goes a revocation of the license and the transfer of the bank to the State Deposit Insurance Corporation "Deposit Insurance Agency". Information letters to the Russian Interior Ministry and FSB Russia about possible wrongdoing are sent, where mostly “one-day” companies are mentoned and the amount passed through their accounts.

               Analysis indicates that in 98 cases banks "burned" in this scheme.

       Net profit from each “burned” bank is calculated from 25-45 million dollars. Later this income is distributed among officials, leaders of the underworld, bosses in Russia and abroad.

             The staff of the Russian Interior Ministry DBOPiT established and documented full conglomerates, including representatives of the criminal world, the FSB of Russia, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, MGTU Bank of Russia, the Bank of Russia, the Presidential Administration.

      So the main people on whom rests the entire criminal business are: Head of the MGTU of Bank of Russia Shore K.B., Deputy Chief of MGTU Galustjan K., Chief of the Bank of Russia GTU №2 G.F. Sitnikov, Head of GTU Bank of Russia № 5 Korneshov A.L. (APS - Russia's FSB), Chief of OSB MOI of Russia for the Central Federal District police Colonel Buzinov S.M., Deputy Chief DEB Russian Interior Ministry police Colonel A.V. Horev, Head of the DRC Ministry of Interior of Russia major general Draguntsov Y.V., Head of ORB N13 of the Russian Interior Ministry police colonel Safronov A.V., Deputy Head of Department "K" the FSB of Russia Dmitry Frolov, a number of managers and employees of the Office of the "M" of the Russian FSB, the former Head of the IC the Russian Interior Ministry police Colonel Shevlyakov T., Head Department of the Russian Interior Ministry Shevarov, former head of the Russian FSB counterintelligence Nechayev.

         These persons are connected to these ethnic gangs: Usoyan H.R. (nicknamed "Grandpa Hassan") Shulaloshvili L.P. (nicknamed "Lasha Rustavski"), Ivankov V.K. (nicknamed "Japonchik"), Malyshev A.I., "Pichuga"

         They monitore the following financial OCC: Myazin I.G., Dvoskin E.V. (nicknamed "Chigrash"), Amerkhanov R., Verteletskiy P.V. (alias "Pasha helicopter"), Rafanovich O.G., Sutaev D.R., Kulikov A.A. (nicknamed "Bird"), Zakharov S.Y. (nicknamed "Red"), Stepanov I.V. (nicknamed "Smola"), etc.

        In 2006 and 2007, the Russian Interior Ministry liquidated group of Sokalskiy B.B. (nickname "Lenin"), D.E. Elbakidze (nicknamed "Juba"), for the murder of first deputy of the Bank of Russia Frankel A.E. is arrested, formerly part of OPS Elbakidze.

        In recent years, according to statistics from the Bank of Russia about 49 credit institutions have been “burned”, including CB "Migros" (previously the organization was registered in Dagestan), KB "Antares" (Dagestan), "Rubin" (Dagestan), Pico-Bank "(Dagestan) "Siberian Development Bank", "Yaroslav", "Hermitage", "Diamond", "Falcon", "Image", "Intelfinans" etc.

           The total damage caused to the state by the illegal activities of organized crime only for the period of 2006-2007 is estimated at more than 4 trillion rubles.

        The result of this phenomenon in the financial system - the total avoidance of any form of ownership of enterprises from taxes, customs duties, embezzlement of budgetary funds, corruption, terrorism, extremism, a jump in inflation, hyperinflation and loss of stability of the entire financial system of Russia. That is a complete undermining of Russia's national security, as their proteges serve more than 50% of financial flows in Russia.